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I shall be concerned here with two key questions for
any theory of knowledge: (1) Is there such a thing as certainty of
knowledge and, if so, what is it? (2) How far does our knowledge
extend, and what are its possible limits? In answering these ques-
tions I shall make use of Bonaventure's seven disputed questions
concerning the knowledge of Christ. This procedure surely calls for
some explanation, since both the author and the subject matter of
these questions seem to fall outside the sphere of philosophical inter-
est. As far as Bonaventure's philosophical importance is concerned,
there still seems to be widespread agreement with Etienne Gilson's
judgment that, in contrast to Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas,
Bonaventure has nothing that can properly be called philosophy, if by
'philosophy' one means the discoveries of reason alone, independent
of the data of revelation.1 Is not this caveat borne out in the very
subject matter of these disputed questions? What can reason alone
tell us about the knowledge of Christ?
1. Etienne Gilson, La philosophic de Saint Bonaventure, 3d ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1924),
p. 387.
35
36 ANDREAS SPEER
If, heedless of such considerations, I persist in using Bonaventure
to address one of the great questions of philosophy, it is because I am
convinced that one can identify in this text an original philosophical
contribution to the two questions I posed at the beginning of this
paper. To see this, one must first reconstruct the context of the
question; in doing so I intend to proceed historically. I shall then
focus on the systematic meaning of Bonaventure's answer. Finally,
the historical dimension will come back in view when I relate this
answer to Bonaventure's work as a whole.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Quaestiones disputatae de scίentia Christi lead us im-
mediately to Bonvaventure's time in Paris. They mark a temporary
peak in a typical academic career of that day, a career that Bonaven-
ture began in 1235 as a student in the Faculty of Arts and that
reached a provisional climax with the licentia docendi and Bonaven-
ture's appointment in 1254 as ordinary regent master in the Faculty of
Theology.2 When he went to Paris in 1235, Bonaventure encountered
a university already thirty-five years old and undergoing a stormy
period in its development. The founding of the university at Paris was
itself an expression of a development with large consequences. It led,
among other things, to a reorganization of teaching, which was now
to be done in a thoroughly "scholastic" or school-ish fashion.3 This
process, begun in the twelfth century, led eventually to a progressive
dissolution of the classical canon of instruction comprising the seven
liberal arts and theology. Moreover the unity of faith and reason,
which had, as Christian doctrine, earlier been able to meet the need
for a comprehensive and persuasive interpretation of the world, now
came apart.4
2. Jacques-Guy Bougerol, Introduction a Saint Bonaventure, rev. ed. (Paris: J. Vrin,
1988), pp. 3-4 and 13-14; Fernand Van Steenberghen, La phibsophie au Xίίίe siέcle
(Louvain: Publications universitaires, and Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1966), pp.
193ff.
3. See for an overview of this point Joseph Koch, "Scholastik," in Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart 5:1494-1498.
4. Wolfgang Kluxen, "Der Begriff der Wissenschaft," in Die Renaissance der Wis~
senschaften im 12. Jahrhundert, ed. Peter Weimar, Zurcher Hochschulforum 2 (Zurich:
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When the young Giovanni Fidanza went to Paris in 1235 as a stu-
dent, just four years had passed since the papal letter of 13 April 123L
With it, Gregory IX had managed to put an end to the fighting at the
University of Paris aroused by his letter of 1228 to the professors of the
theological faculty. At issue were both the use of speculative method
and the employment of philosophical expressions and concepts in the
exposition of the doctrine of the faith. The controversies were ignited
principally by the employment of Aristotle's writings, especially of the
so-called libri naturales, in philosophical and theological instruction.5
The libri naturales had already been condemned in 1210 by the decrees
of a regional synod of Sens under Peter of Corbeil, Archbishop of
Paris. The synodal prohibition was directed in particular against the
alleged heresies of Aumary of Bene and David of Dinant, but in
August 1215 it entered the new university statutes of the Faculty of
Arts, which permitted instruction in Aristotle's logical and dialectical
writings but not in the "libri Aristotelis de methaphisica et de naturali
philosophia."6 The effect of the prohibition was minimal, as the
intervention of Gregory IX indicates. The pope himself was finally
compelled to open a way to the study of Aristotle's writings on natural
philosophy and metaphysics.
One would not do justice to the situation at the beginning of
the thirteenth century if one were to see in these conflicts merely a
power struggle between the Church's magisterium and the university.
Gregory IX had himself studied theology in Paris. Like Innocent HI,
who was involved in the dispute over the statutes in 1215, Gregory
had been a student of Peter the Chanter, who was master of theology
at Notre Dame from about 1170 until his death in 1197. The con-
flicts had rather to do with a question of fundamental importance.
Theology faced the challenge of determining afresh its position in
connection with the new understanding of science. In place of the
Artemis, 1981), pp. 273-293; and Georg Wieland, Ethica—scientia practica: Die
Anfdnge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert, BGPTM N S 21 (Munster:
Aschendorff, 1981), pp. 9-18; and Speer, "Wissenschaft und Erkenntnis: Zur Wissen-
schaftslehre Bonaventuras," Wissenschaft und Weisheit 49 (1986): 169ff.
5. For an overview, see Van Steenberghen, La phίlosophie au Xίίle siέcle, pp. 100-
110.
6. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Heinrich Denifle and Emile Chatelain
(Paris: Freres Delalain, 1889), 1:78-79, no. 20; Van Steenberghen, La phibsophie au
Xίίle siecle, pp. 89-99.
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"holy relevance" of studies directed towards the better understanding
of revelation, there now comes amor scientiae, scientific knowledge
in accordance with rational principles, pursued for its own sake.
Theology became a science among sciences, its status determined
under universal notions. With that displacement came the question of
the relationship between scientific rationality and the revealed truths
of salvation.7
THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTION
For his first great disputation after becoming ordinary
master, Bonaventure chose the question of Christ's knowledge (No*
vember 1253-spring 1254). He had already treated it once before in
the context of his lectures on the Sentencesβ But in his lectures he
had been bound by the program of the Sentences, of the antholo-
gized authorities obligatory for all commentators. In the Quaestiones
disputatae de scientia Cfiristί, we have Bonaventure's independent and
systematic grappling with this topic, one chosen by him as suitable to
solemn public disputation.
With his choice of topic, Bonaventure seizes an obviously theo-
logical problem, the question of Christ's knowledge. This question
may now seem academic, but properly considered it leads to a host of
theologically and philosophically important issues. To see the philo-
sophical significance, one must first discuss the theological content,
which results from the teaching on the hypostatic union by the Coun-
cil of Chalcedon (451). The dogmatic exposition of the council, that
Jesus Christ was one single person, perfect in Godhead and perfect in
humanity, formed the provisional endpoint in a struggle that defined
7. Albert Zimmermann, "Die Theologie und die Wissenschaften," in Die Renais-
sance der Wissenschaften, pp. 87-93; Kluxen, "Der Begriff der Wissenschaft," pp. 281-
283; Joachim Ehlers, "Monastische Theologie, historischer Sinn und Dialektik: Tra-
dition und Neuerung in der Wissenschaft des 12. Jahrhunderts," in Anύqui und
Moderni, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9 (Berlin and New York:
W. de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 58-62.
8. For the dating, see Bougerol, Introduction, pp. 4-6. For the earlier treatment,
see Bougerol, p. 201, and Bonaventure Sent. 3.14 as in Opera omnia 3, ed. CSB
(Quaracchi: CSB, 1887) 295a-326b.
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the first centuries of Christianity—the struggle over the mystery of the
hypostatic union, which stands at the center of Christian belief about
the redemption.9 The redemption can be thought of as a perfection
immanent in a human being only if Jesus Christ is truly human, but
it can have universal efficacy only so far as he is also truly God.
If one refuses to leave this as just a paradox, accepted on faith but
ultimately intractable to theological reasoning, a host of problems
arises from the teaching that Christ has two natures. These problems
determined the rapidly evolving dogmatics of the centuries following
Chalcedon. How can this union of the two subsistent natures in
one person or hypostasis be conceived, when according to the classic
formulation of Lateran IV (1215) the distance between Creator and
creation is so great that any similarity grounded in the act of creation
is conditioned by a far greater dissimilarity? Again, how can one con~
ceive the participation of the human nature in the divine? This second
question has wide implications for the problem of the hypostatic union
and leads into the deeper realm of the possibilities for philosophical-
theological affirmation. The same is true of the question about how
properties and attributes can be predicated of this one person. The
unity of the person should not be lost from one side or the other,
nor can there be an inadmissible exchange of properties {idiomata)
between the natures that are bound together, though never confused,
in Christ—even though these properties can be common to the person
or hypostasis as their underlying subject. Over the course of the history
of theology, basic rules covering the so-called "communication of
idioms" were laid down. These were supposed to help preserve the
hard-won Christological via media that had been achieved by the
orthodox councils.10
The seventh disputed question about the knowledge of Christ
provides a clear example of this logically engrossing problem. Does
the human soul of Christ understand all divine judgments? Does it
9. Herbert Vorgrimler, Ήypostatische Union," LTK 5:579-584; Rowan Williams,
"Jesus Christus, II: Alte Kirche," TRE 16:726-745, especially pp. 734-742; Alain
Michel, Ήypostatique (Union)," DTC 7:437-568.
10. Karl Forster, "Idiomenkommunikation," LTK 5:607-609; J. F. Rigney, "Com-
munication of Idioms," NCE 4:35-37; A. Michel, "Idiomes (Communications des),"
DTC 7:595-602; Arthur M. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Fruhscholastik, 2: Die Lehre
von Christus (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1953) 1:138-146.
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possess all the knowledge of the divine Word that is united to it?
And does it possess it so far as Christ is a human being? The rules
for discourse about the communication of idioms, which Bonaventure
invokes when replying to the objections raised, help him to grasp the
issue. This issue does not consist in the one hypostasis that can bear
diverse attributes, but rather in the ordering of the attributes—in this
case, of knowledge—to the two natures, because no simple exchange
of attributes is admissible.11
But then how are we to think of the psychological unity of Christ?
Anselm gave this question prominence in Cur Όeus homo. After him,
under the influence of Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor, among others,
the emphasis was all on the perfection of Christ's human knowledge.1 2
This emphasis remains important for Bonaventure's posing of the
question. He learned it in detail from his teacher, Alexander of Hales.
Alexander treated the matter in his Gloss on the Sentences, in the
Summa attributed to him, and in a disputed question of his own. He
concluded in all three that Christ had in God a perfect knowledge of
God and the world, and had a perfect knowledge of things by means
of himself. Thus, Christ's human nature has genuine knowledge of its
own.
1 3
 In terms of the psychology of knowledge, Alexander teaches,
in harmony with the Augustinian tradition, that God is both the
first-known {primum cognitum) and the psychologically first source of
knowledge about the world.1 4
The question of the relative independence of the human being
begins to carry more weight within the context of Aristotelian psy^
chology, since the Aristotelian doctrine of the active and possible in-
tellects seems to preclude every priority of divine illumination. Hence,
the need for a new psychological and epistemological grounding for
the originally theological thesis that God is first known. He is first in
11. De scienύa Chήsύ 7 ob. 1-3 and ad 1-3 (CSB 5:37a-b, 40b).
12. Jan Th. Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der voUkom-
menen Erkenntnis Chrtsti, Freiburger theologische Studien 89 (Freiburg: Herder, 1971),
pp. 53-96. See also Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frύhscholastik, 2: Die Lehre von
Chήstus, 2:44-68.
13. Alexander of Hales Gbssa in Sent. 3.13.10-3.14.24 (3:131-149), and Alexan-
der Quaestiones disputatae "antequam essetfrater" 42 (2:414-730). Compare tbe Summa
"fratxis Akxanάά" 3.3.2 (4:163-171). See also Ernst, Erkenntnis Ckristi, pp. 113-129.
14. Ernst, Erkenntnis Chrίsti, pp. 151-153.
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regard to his noetic priority and in regard to human knowledge of the
world, for which the human being's relation to the world must also
be taken into account.
THE SOUL OF CHRIST AS MODEL
Against such a complex background, one can begin to
appreciate the interest that moved Bonaventure to take up, again, the
question of Christ's knowledge. He could now take it up on his own
terms and so use the series of disputed questions to go far beyond the
answers permitted by the limits of a commentary on Sentences 3.
In the fourteenth distinctio of that book, Bonaventure poses the
questions in the way laid out for him by the authorities. He traces
this way in the divisio textus on the problem of Christ's omnipotence
and omniscience.15 He finally reaches the overarching issue of this
distinctio, the question of the perfection of the knowledge that Christ's
soul possessed eminently. He unfolds the issue in three articles of three
questions each. Much rests on the distinction in the knowledge that
Christ's soul had about the divine Word (de Verbo), in the divine
Word (in Verbo), and from the divine Word (a Verbo). Bonaventure
discusses all three kinds of knowledge in relation to the divine Word,
which the prologue to the Gospel of John describes as the exemplary
prototype of all that is (1:3). Thus there is self-knowledge in Christ
(de Verbo) as well as his knowledge of things in their actual and
exemplary being (in Verbo), and also the perfection of that knowledge
in omnipotence and omniscience (a Verbo).16
If one can already discern here that Bonaventure is less interested
in psychological than in epistemological issues, the structure of the
seven disputed questions de sdentia Christi makes it altogether clear
that the question of Christ's knowledge cannot be treated even the-
ologically outside an epistemological horizon. Indeed, one can get
the well-founded impression that it is precisely the epistemological
implications of the question about Christ's knowledge that enticed
15. Sent. 3.14.1-2 and άivisio textus (CSB 3:283a-294b and 295a-b).
16. Sent. 3.14.1-3 (CSB 3:294a-325b). Compare Ernst, Erkenntnis Christi, pp.
144-160.
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Bonaventure to treat the question so thoroughly. This is shown both
by the polished and well-developed lines of argument in the epis-
temologically significant questions, especially the fourth, and by the
systematic attack, which differs from that in the commentary on the
Sentences. Consider the order of questions:17
1. Does the knowledge of Christ, so far as he is the divine Word,
actually extend to the infinite?
2. Does God know things by means of their Ideas or by means of
their essence ("per essentiam11)'!
3. Does God know things by means of Ideas that really differ from
one another?
4. Is what is known by us with certainty known in the eternal
Ideas themselves?
5. Was the soul of Christ wise only through the uncreated wisdom,
or wise through both created and uncreated wisdom?
6. Did the soul of Christ grasp uncreated wisdom itself?
7. Did the soul of Christ grasp everything that uncreated wisdom
grasps?
I have indicated the obvious division into three parts. Christ's
divine knowledge is the point of departure in the first three questions.
What does this knowledge include? How does it proceed? In what
manner does it concern itself with things, and how are they contained
in it? We shall return at greater length to the metaphysical background
of these questions.
There follows in the fourth question the hinge of the whole col'
lection. In its very articulation, the epistemological interest becomes
unmistakably clear. The same is true of the central point of that episte-
mology, the problem of the certainty of knowledge. Bonaventure sets
up the twofold criterion of infallibility on the part of the subject and
of the object.18 How can one know with certainty what something is?
17. I have just published a new edition based on the Quaracchi-text with a Ger-
man translation, corrective notes, and a detailed introduction (Hamburg: F. Meiner,
1992).
18. Scientίa Christi 4 (5:23b): "cognitio certitudinalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex
parte scibilis immutabilitas et infallibilitas ex parte scientis."
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By knowing it completely, that is, under all the conditions that cover
both object and subject. As Bonaventure says elsewhere, appealing
to Aristotle, "For it is then that we know, namely, when we believe
that we know the reason why a thing is, and when we know that it
is impossible that the thing be otherwise."19
The next three questions pursue this issue. They discuss the possi-
bility that Christ's soul grasped wisdom perfectly. But in the Augus-
tinian tradition 'wisdom' is the usual name for the epitome of perfect
knowledge, and thus for a knowledge that has a perfect grasp of the
conditions under which it exists.20
Thus, Bonaventure can take Christ's soul as the model when he
discusses comprehensively the conditions of knowledge and of science,
bringing together into systematic form elements that appeared at
various points when commenting on the Sentences. Among the more
significant of these points, in addition to 3.14, are 1.35 (on God's
knowledge in itself and in general) and 1.43 (on the divine power with
regard to illimitability). Both distinctions from the first Book disclose
an eminently epistemological interest.21 The theological implications
of the question of Christ's knowledge are always developed against a
philosophical background.
Bonaventure himself hands us this key to interpreting the questions
concerning Christ's knowledge in their epilogue. He points out retro*
spectively that from everything "which has been said and determined
about the wisdom of Christ with respect to both the divine and the
human nature, there can be seen the manner of knowing both in the
knowledge of the Creator and in the knowledge of the creature, not
only in the fatherland, but even in the pilgrim state"—not only in the
state of perfection, but even under the present conditions of mortal
19. Chήstus unus omnium est magister 6 (5:568b-569a): "Tune enim scimus, cum
casum arbitramur cognoscere, propter quam res est, et scimus, quoniam impossibile
est aliter se habere."
20. See Tilman Borsche, Was etwas ist: Fragen nach der Wahrheit der Bedeu^
tung hex Platon, Augustinus, Nikolaus von Kues und Nietzsche (Munich: Fink, 1990),
p. 113. But compare to this Aristotle's remarks on knowledge as episteme of causes
(aitias) and principles (archas) in Metaphysics 1.2 (982a4-6). On the question of
the certainty of knowledge, see further Speer, Triplex veritas: Warheitsverstάndnis und
phibsophische Denkform Bonaventuras, Franziskanische Forschungen 32 (Werl/Westf.:
Dietrich Coelde, 1987), pp. 54-56.
21. Sent. 1.35 (CSB l:599a-616b), 1.39 (l:684a-699b), and 1.43 (1:763-778).
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existence.2 2 This statement is worth unfolding more closely, using as
a guide the individual questions.
EXEMPLARISM
The issue of the first question arises on the doctrine,
which goes back to Augustine, that God's knowledge is the original
principle of everything that is. It includes everything actual and every-
thing possible, since God alone, "by beholding himself as truth, knows
the entire truth." God alone can, therefore, simply abstract from every
cause, for he is ultimately the cause of all that is.2^ But things must not
be considered only in themselves and their own causality, in their own
species, but also in their exemplarity, in their essential relatedness to
the ultimate creative cause.24 This cause lies in God's knowledge, the
creative principle of the existence and intelligibility of all creatures.
God's knowledge in the "exemplary forms" (formae exemplares) and
according to the "eternal ideas" (sempίternae rationes) describes at once
the ontological distance and the ontological proximity of Creator and
creation. It also suggests the gnoseological consequences.25
That is the subject of the second question. The eternal ideas cannot
be the true essences (essentiae) and quiddities (quidditates) of things,
since the eternal ideas cannot be separated from the Creator. "Cre-
ator and creature necessarily have different essences."26 The principal
concepts through which Bonaventure attempts to describe adequately
the relationship between Creator and creature are similitudo, assimi*
latio, expressio, exemplaritas, and repraesentatio. This group of terms
poses many problems for translation, and any particular rendering
will depend on the context. But Bonaventure maintains consistency
of meaning throughout, as becomes clear in the following example.
In the conceptual field of exemplarism, there stands out one
concept that is peculiarly suited to encompass all significant aspects—
similitudo. Similitudo describes a relation, indeed an immediate and
22. Scientia Christi epilogue (CSB 5:42b).
23. Scientia Chήsti 1 (CSB 5:5a-b).
24. Sent. 1.39.1.1 ad 3 (CSB 1:686b).
25. Scientia Christi 2 (CSB 5:8b); compare Speer, Triplex υeritas, p. 102.
26. Scientia Chrisή 2 (CSB 5:8b).
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simple relation between two relata that are related to each other.
"One is the image of the other" (unum est simίlitudo alterius), with-
out its being the case that a third relatum forms the actual stan-
dard for this relation.27 This relation of likeness can now be read
in two directions by applying the ontological relationship of cre-
ated beings to their creative origin. u[O]n the one hand as imita-
tive likeness {similitudo imitativa), as the creature is the likeness of
the Creator (similitudo Creatoris); on the other hand as likeness of
the prototype (similitudo exemplativa), as the prototypical standard
and likeness (ratio exemplaris et similitudo) of the creature is in the
Creator."28
This ontological distinction has as its epistemological corollary the
distinction between knowledge that is caused by things (notitia causata
a rebus) and knowledge that is itself the cause of things (notitia causans
res). The creature's capacity for knowledge is actualized by principles
exhibited in reality; the relation between knower and known is there-
fore similitudo imίtativa. The divine intellect, by contrast, holds the
principles of knowledge in itself. It compares them with what exists
because, as similitudo exemplativa, it is truth able to express itself, the
expressive principle of the existence and intelligibility of everything
that is ("sua summa veritate omnia aeternaliter exprimens").29 The
exemplarity of God, thus, guarantees the truth of what exists, because
what exists is first exemplified in the summa veritas. If it is known that
this highest truth exists, then the identity of the order of knowledge
and the order of being is also known. Bonaventure attempts such
a proof in several places by trying to show that the denial of a
highest truth, in fact, presupposes the existence of such a performative
contradiction, or that the notion of highest truth once understood
includes the existence of that truth (the ratio Anseίmi).30 Here one
sees the systematic place of the thesis that God is the first known.
At this point, however, there also appears the crucial difference
between Bonaventure's understanding of exemplarism, as decisively
27. Sάentia Christi 2 (CSB 5:9a).
28. Sάentia Christi 2 (CSB 5:9a). Compare Speer, Triplex veritas, pp. 102f.
29. Scientia Chήsti 2 (CSB 5:9a).
30. Scientia Christi 4.12 (CSB 5:18b), 6.5 (5:34a), 4 ad 16 (5:25b), 4 ad 23-26
(5:26b-27b). See also Coll. in Hexaemeron 4.1 (5:349a) and Speer, Triplex veήtas,
pp. 46-48.
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shaped by Augustine, and Platonic or neo-Platonic exemplarisms.
The divine prototype does not stand on the summit of a pyramid
of being that results from a process of emanation. Rather, as the
archetypal expression of the divine ground, as the everlasting Word,
the divine prototype is equally immediate to each of its creaturely
images. Conversely, things not only possess a meaning in themselves,
they bring to mind as creaturely copies the divine original "penes
modum repraesentandί."3 1 The creature is God's trace {vestigium),
image (imago), and likeness (similitudo). Thus, as Bonaventure says
in the body of the fourth question, "every creature is a trace because
it is from God, an image when it knows God, a likeness so far as
God dwells in it. From this threefold gradation of relationship there
follows a threefold gradation of divine cooperation."3 2
CERTAINTY OF KNOWLEDGE AND
THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS
The intelligibility of things corresponds to their onto-
logical structure. For Bonaventure, as we have seen, all knowledge
lies under the postulate of certainty, which is necessarily valid on
account of the excellence of knowledge and the worthiness of the
knower.33 But how can this requirement be met? At the beginning
of the fourth question, Bonaventure discusses two positions, both of
which seem to him inadequate, indeed erroneous. It is not the case
that certain knowledge can exist only in the intelligible world of the
eternal prototypes, nor can one speak of a mere influence on knowing
of the eternal standard {ratio aeterna) without its being the case that
the eternal standard itself could be reached.34
Created truth (veritas creata) is not simply unchangeable, it is
unchangeable only in consequence of a fundamental condition. So
Bonaventure seeks a third way between the two rejected positions.
"In order to achieve with necessity a knowledge that lays claim to
31. Sent. 1.3.1.1.2 ad 4 (CSB 1:73a); Speer, Triplex veritas, pp. 105f.
32. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:24a).
33. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:23b).
34. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:23a).
CERTAINTY AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE 47
certainty, there is sought an eternal standard to guide and drive—not
by itself and in its perfect clarity, but together with a created standard,
and in such a way that it is to some degree seen by us even in the
state of imperfection."35 This eternal standard is the ars aeterna, the
eternal creative art, in which things are considered according to their
conceptual and specific mode of existence.
This complex sphere of the ars aeterna, which mediates the orders
of being and knowledge, usually appears philosophically in connection
with the question of Bonaventure's theory of ideas. The idea has the
function of a twofold principle of mediation: it betokens on the level
of being the relation of creaturely reality to its creative source; and
it shows on the level of knowledge the relationship between subject
and object.36
Following Augustine, Bonaventure places the source of the ideas
in God's knowledge. God, knowing himself, turns upon his own
being and expresses himself in his eternal Word.37 The ideas, thus,
participate in God's essence and the mode of his own thinking. With
reference to our knowledge, the idea is the "standard of knowledge"
(ratio cognoscenti).3S As regula, norma, or lex, the highest truth be-
comes in the idea the norm for the knowing intellect in regard both
to immutability and causation; it is the eternal standard that regulates
and sets in motion ("ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva").39 But
while the idea as standard of the divine knowledge is an expression
of God's creative knowledge (similitudo expressive), in relation to the
human intellect it betokens a relationship of similarity as guarantor
of knowledge {similitudo impressa). What is known is the truth it-
self, even if mediated by the idea. The creative act of the rational
creature is to follow this standard of knowledge, without in any way
constituting it.4°
35. Scientia Chήsti 4 (CSB 5:23b).
36. See Sent. 1.35.1.3 (CSB 1:608a).
37. Scientia Christi 3 (CSB 5:13b-14a), 4.23-27 (5:19t>-20a, "rationes Augustinί").
Compare the entry "Idee" in Historisches Worterbuch der Phifosophie 4:63-65 and
4:87f. The classical Augustinian source is De diversis quaestionibus 83 46.1-2 (CSEL
44A:70.1-73.73).
38. Compare Sent. 1.35.1.1 (CSB 1:601a).
39. Scientia Chrisύ 4 (CSB 5:23b).
40. Sent. 1.35.1.1 (CSB 1:601b).
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For the doctrine of ideas thus conceived, there arises now, as a
special problem, the multiplicity of ideas. How can this multiplicity,
which serves as pattern for classes and individuals alike, be conceived
in relation to God's unity? On the one hand, it cannot be that "to
produce a human being is to produce an ass." On the other hand, the
multiplicity of appearances cannot import any real multiplicity into
God's being.4 1 Bonaventure tries to solve this problem by referring
to two different moments in the idea. As an expression of the divine
creative power, the idea stands more to God's side; as constitutive
element of our knowledge, it is more strongly present in the being
known now. But since God, in reality, does not turn towards anything
other than himself, the ideal standards in God cannot be thought of
as a real multiplicity (secundum rem), but only as a conceptual one
(secundum rationem). "[T]he concept arises not only from the side of
the knower but also from the side of the object known.'"*2 That is
how the ideas, so far as they are standards of knowledge (secundum
rationem intelligendi), can denote what is really distinct. The unity-in-
reality is the expression of the unity of the one divine truth in itself
and with itself. It can express and represent the entire multiplicity of
actual and possible reality. The plurality for knowledge, on the other
hand, is an expression of the kind and manner of our intellectual
participation in the one divine truth. "If the many ideas therefore
also possess a unity in fact (re), so that they can be called the one
truth and the one divine Word, they can nevertheless possess no unity
according to their meaning (ratione) so that one could speak of several
ideas or standards (ίdeae vel rationes) as a single idea or standard."4 3
For the human intellect, then, the multiplicity and diversity of ideas
represents itself as a reality. It denotes ad modum rei the concrete
way-of'being of things.4**
The difficult problem of the unity and plurality of ideas is reflected
in Bonaventure's terminology, which is by no means completely con^
sistent. Whereas idea, ratio, and similitudo are used in both singular and
plural, exemplar, ars, and verbum are spoken of only in the singular.
Ratio and idea apply primarily to things in their distinctness, while
41. Scientia Christi 3 (CSB 5:14a).
42. Scientia Christi 3 (CSB 5:14a).
43. Scientia Christi 3 ad 19 (CSB 5:16b).
44. Scientia Christi 3 ad 2 (CSB 5:14b).
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the remaining concepts relate the multiplicity of things to their first
principle as source and goal.45
It is now clear why Bonaventure must reject the extreme positions
cited at the beginning. He thinks that they lead to skeptical aporia, to
the conclusion "that one can know absolutely nothing."46 Beyond the
a priori moment, an a posteriori or empirical moment is indispensable
for the achievement of knowledge, and conversely. In order to know,
the intellect must not only turn itself toward the rationes aeternae, but
also proceed from the essences abstracted from experience.47 The ideas
are not the obiectum quod of human knowledge, but only the obiectum
quo, through whose influence we attain certainty. Consequently, the
ideas can only be grasped reflexively by the human intellect. As
formal principles of knowing, they first guarantee certainty on the
part of both the objects and subjects of knowledge. But the specifying
properties and material principles arise out of experience.48 One sees
here the influence of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. Bonaven^
ture discusses it thoroughly in the opposite, of the fourth question
and rehearses it again in the following answer.49 He arrives thus
at a distinctive solution that thoroughly modifies the Augustinian
conception.
CERTAINTY AND ILLUMINATION
The so-called "theory of illumination" both derives from
Augustine and is much modified from Augustine. This doctrine allows
us to summarize, under the guidance of the fourth question, the
answers that were developed by using exemplarism and the theory of
ideas, as it allows us to bring them to bear on the following questions.
For Bonaventure, too, light is a "metaphysical conjecture" for truth as
well as a "model" for the relation between unity and plurality, between
45. See on this point Sent. 1.35.1.3 ad 2 (CSB 1:608b) and Speer, Triplex veritas,
pp. 99f.
46. Scientia Chήsti 4 (CSB 5:23a).
47. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:24b).
48. Scientia Ckristi 4 (CSB 5:23b-24a); Speer, Triplex veήtas, p. 101.
49. See especially Scientia Christi 4 ob. 7-16 (CSB 5:21b-22a) and the corre-
sponding replies, ad 7-16 (5:25a-b).
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the absolute and the conditioned, between source and descendant.5 0
In order to illustrate this, he takes over from Augustine the example
of the godless person who can think a concept like eternity and judge
rightly regarding rules of practical living because in doing so "he turns
himself to that light by which he is always touched, even when he
turned himself away from it." 5 1
Behind this, the problematic of certainty appears once more, for
Bonaventure sees, with Augustine, the cause of the pagan's knowledge
in rules "that are written down in the book of that light which is called
Truth." 5 2 These rules are obviously in force quite independently of the
mistakes of the knower and the always deficient objects known. The
metaphor of "illumination" emphasizes the non-empirical origin of
the judgments, which do not have their origin in experience and
are not the outcome of a process of abstraction. Although Bonaven-
ture requires, for full knowledge, a tracing back "to an altogether
unchangeable and fixed truth as well as to an altogether infallible
light," the influence of the light cannot be seen only as general, as
if both knowledge and wealth were indebted to that influence in the
same manner; nor can it be seen only as special, as if all knowledge
were infused and no knowledge were acquired or innate. 5 3 Thus, the
epistemological problematic in the theory of illumination becomes
noticeably stronger when focused on the individual subject. How are
we to conceive concretely of the cooperation of the infallible light
of truth, especially since Bonaventure does not fundamentally reject
the Aristotelian arguments, but seeks instead to integrate them into
his own theory of knowledge?54 The distinction between a created
standard (ratio creata) and an eternal standard (ratio aeterna), between
the light of the creature (lux creaturae) and the infallible light (lux
infallibilis), between a lower reason (ratio inferior) and a higher reason
50. Hans Blumenberg, "Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit," Studium Generate 10
(1957): 432; Klaus Hedwig, Sphaera lucis: Studien zur Intelligibilitdt des Seienden im
Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation, BGPTM N S 18 (Munster: Aschendorff,
1980), pp. 161-165.
51. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:23b); Augustine De Trinitate 14.15.21 (CCSL 50A:
450.35-39).
52. Augustine De Tήnitate 14.15.21 (CCSL 50A:451.49-50).
53. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:23b).
54. See Scientia Chήsti 4 ob. 7-9 and 14 (CSB 5:21b, 22a), together with ad 7-9
and 14 (5:25a, b).
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(ratio superior), will open a way that makes possible a nuanced reply
to this question.
We see it in the following three questions, which treat the hu-
man knowledge of Christ. We already have a preparatory hint in
Bonaventure's reply to the second oppositum. There, in connection
with a quotation from Augustine, Bonaventure proposes the claim
that if the light of the eternal truth were the standard of knowledge
for all true things, no soul would know anything true unless it were
pure and holy. Since the consequent is not the case, the antecedent
is also denied.55 Bonaventure solves this objection by distinguishing
between knowledge and wisdom. To be sure, a knower knows by means
of the eternal ideas, but not with complete firmness. Only the wise
man can do that, since he knows them in peace; the knowledge of
the rationes aeternae cannot be taken away from him again.56
FROM KNOWLEDGE TO WISDOM
What is meant by the distinction between knowledge
and wisdom? First, we must recall what we said in the overview of
the questions with reference to wisdom as the epitome of perfect
knowledge. Consider a figure of speech that Bonaventure uses almost
universally in this connection: in via in pαtriα.57 It would be a mistake
to see in this figure of speech only a Christίan-soteriological motif. It
serves primarily to get a better grasp on the dilemma in the analysis
of human knowledge that is also expressed as a distinction between
wisdom and knowledge.
In the present state of imperfection we sometimes arrive, in our
search for a foundation guaranteeing certainty to our knowledge, at
such principles in which the ratio aeterna is recognized only in its gen-
erality, as an a priori ground of epistemic certainty, but not in itself.58
The discursive intellect of the knower thus attains only principles that
regulate knowledge, that guarantee no lasting certainty, because they
55. Scienύa Christi 4 ob. 2 (CSB 5:21a), together with Augustine De Trinitate
12 A (CCSL 50:31.9-11).
56. Scientia Christi 4 ad 2 (CSB 5:24b).
57. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:24a-b), 6 (5:35a-b), 7 (5:40a), epilogue (5:42b).
58. Scientia Chήsti 4 ad 16 (CSB 5:25b).
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cannot trace back the knowledge to the ultimate principle. Only in
that reductio would our struggle for certain knowledge come to rest
and to fulfillment.59 Such a knowledge, however, exceeds the domain
of discursive reason and reaches an immediate insight into that ul-
timate principle, which Bonaventure calls interchangeably "eternal
standard" (ratio aeterna), "highest truth" (summa veritas), "infallible
light" (lux infallibilis), "supreme creative art" (superna ars), and "God."
But this perfect knowledge, which both exceeds the natural capacity
of the rational soul and perfects its immanent struggle, can no longer
be reckoned a part of knowledge in the strict sense. Bonaventure,
therefore, speaks of an excessus, an "overstepping" or "exceeding" of
knowledge into wisdom. It happens only to a few, to the perfected
intellects, "which is why only a few are wise and many can know." 6 0
Following the twelth-century tradition of so-called speculative mys-
ticism, which is associated with names like Hugh and Richard of
St. Victor,6 1 Bonaventure displays in the body of the seventh ques-
tion six steps of a path from mere belief to perfect comprehension.
Perfect comprehension is, of course, reserved for the eternal Trinity.
The rational soul reaches the outer limit in insight on the level of
overstepping (excedere): it sees God and so arrives at an immediate
unitary view of the supreme principle and the highest truth itself,
without becoming one with that truth. This is true not only of the case
in statu viae where we are moved, enraptured, and lifted up—which
signifies each time a special overstepping of the present state—but
also of the state of perfection in patria.62
PERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND CREATED
WISDOM
In the last three questions, Bonaventure opens a second
perspective on the understanding of wisdom. The point of departure
59. Scientia Christi 4 ad 19 (CSB 5:26a).
60. Scientia Christi 4 ad 19 (5:26a), 6 (CSB 5:35a). Compare Itinerarium mentis in
Deum 1.6 (CSB 5:297b), Collationes in Hexaemeron 19.3 (CSB 5:420b).
61. See "^Contemplation," LM 5:1414-1416, and Έxtase," DS 14:2113-2120.
62. Scientia Christi 4 (CSB 5:24b), 6 (5:35a-b). See also Itinerarium 1.2-6 (CSB
5:297a-b), 7.1 (5:312a); Speer, Triplex veritas, pp. 75-79 and 118-120. Compare
Έxtase," DS 4:2120-2125.
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for this is an obviously theological one. It begins with Christ's human
knowledge, not in its full phenomenological breadth, but rather as
it extends to the uncreated wisdom and to everything that Christ
can see in that uncreated wisdom. Bonaventure distinguishes created
wisdom from this. The distinction follows from the manner of the
influence and presence of the supreme light of truth in knowledge
that lays claim to certainty. A merely general influence, without the
immediate presence of that light, is as obviously insufficient as its
mere presence without the possibility of an immediate influence.63
This addresses, once again, the problem of the participation of the
created souls in the ratio aeterna and their cooperation in the coming'
to-be of certain knowledge. Bonaventure's answer follows from the
line of thinking up to this point, but it expands during the discussion
of the extent of human knowledge in the last three questions.
If we know with certainty only when we comprehend all of the
conditions of knowledge and possess wisdom, then it cannot be satis-
factory to suppose such knowledge exclusively in the state of perfec-
tion, for then this insight would run the risk of having the character
merely of a provisional, relative truth. Human knowledge, striving
after certainty, must also have the ability to extend to that uncreated
wisdom, which itself can be reached only by a deiform and ecstatic
intellect. The manner in which the created intellect can participate
in the uncreated wisdom in statu viae, and at the same time in the
"forming, enabling, and uplifting principle," is created wisdom.6"* Ac-
cording to Bonaventure, the soul of Christ was also, so far as he was a
human being, bound to this sapientia creata as a necessary condition of
his having wisdom. But this knowledge was at the same time limited,
since Christ's soul did not have actual knowledge of everything that
it knew as the divine Word. In this way, Bonaventure manages to
conform to the teaching of the Council of Chalcedon and to the
requirements of the communication of idioms.65
This brings us back to the first question: Is the knowledge of Christ,
so far as he is the divine Word, really infinite? The background of
this question is the doctrine, going back to Augustine, of the origin
of being in God's knowledge, in his eternal, uncreated wisdom. In the
63. Sάentia Christi 5 (CSB 5:29b).
64. Sάentia Christi 5 (CSB 5:30a), 6 (5:34b).
65. Sάentia Chήsti 6 (CSB 5:35a), 7 ad 1-3 (5:40b). Compare Ernst, Erkenntms
Chήsti, pp. 163-165.
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sixth question too, Bonaventure seizes on the infinite, specifically of
infinite truth and goodness which alone can fulfill the understanding
and appetite of the rational soul and bring it to rest when the soul is
lifted up above its own capacity for understanding.66
Driven by the goal of knowing the totality of being and of its
ultimate ground, the intellectual capacity experiences its limits with
all clarity. But the natural limit of creaturely knowledge lies not so
much in a limitation on the domain of objects, but rather in the im-
perfection of that capacity itself, in its limitation to knowing secundum
esse, to the knowledge of actual being. By contrast, perfect insight into
every structure and condition that determines the universe, knowledge
"in accordance with that divine art, through which all things come
to be," is denied to the created soul.67 The reason for this lies in the
very nature of knowledge secundum esse, which is determined by five
criteria: dominance of the subject of knowledge in the act of know-
ing, fulfillment of only one domain of the striving after knowledge,
discursiveness, the analytic quality of the judgments, and limitation
to a finite horizon. In contrast, the exceeding knowledge secundum
artem is likewise distinguished by five analogously formulated criteria:
dominance of the object of knowledge as the encompassing goal of all
knowledge, perfect fulfillment of the entire appetite for knowledge,
the abolition of the discursive limitation as well as of the limitation
to analytic and synthetic judgments, and finally the directedness to
an infinite horizon.68
It should be pointed out that Bonaventure here defines the meaning
of comprehending knowledge (cognitio comprehensiυa) and exceeding
knowledge (cognitio excessίva) in immediate dependence on pseudo-
Dionysius and, so, in contrast to the scheme of levels in the sixth
question, which relies on Augustinian speculative mysticisms.69 With
pseudo-Dionysius, Bonaventure describes that exceeding not as tran-
scensus but as excessus. For the subject of knowledge does not out-
strip the object of knowledge; rather, the one who has "exceeding"
knowledge is brought to the object of knowledge "by going beyond
66. Scientia Chήsti 6 (CSB 5:35a).
67. Scientia Chήsti 7 ad 4 (CSB 5:40b-41a).
68. Scientia Christi 7 (CSB 5:40a-b); Speer, Triplex veήtas, pp. 80f.
69. Compare Scientia Chήsti 6 (CSB 5:35a) and the preceding section. See further
"Kontemplation," LM 5:1414-1416, and "Extase," DS 4:2125-2126.
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himself in a way that exceeds everything, whereby he lifts himself
above himself."70
It would be a mistake to see in this determination of the extent
of knowledge a boundless epistemological optimism. On the contrary,
one sees a string of what are unmistakably epistemological critiques.
They hold especially for the knowledge that is founded on reason
alone, but also for the possibility of a perfect comprehension of the
highest truth on the basis of an acquired and, therefore, created
wisdom. Even a supernatural illumination that raised the soul to
know things in the eternal divine art would allow it to know the
contingent with certainty, but would not effect an actual knowledge
of the infinite. Thus, it would not make possible a surpassing of the
souΓs own finitude.71
This is the only explanation of the conclusion of the collection of
questions, which had its systematic point of departure in the question
of the knowledge of the infinite. In the epilogue, Bonaventure sum-
marizes the line-of'thought of the seven questions in order to draw out
what might seem at first a surprising conclusion. The insight into the
process of knowledge that he has won, which culminates in surpassing,
in exceeding (excessus), as the utmost and most excellent manner of
knowing, leads Bonaventure to the conclusion that negative propose
tίons are more suitable than affirmative, exceeding predications (su*
perpositiones) than positive predications {positivae praedicationes), in
grasping this true wisdom. Quite in the spirit of Dionysian negative
theology and with an appeal to the writings of the alleged disciple of
the Apostle Paul, Bonaventure points out that "an inner silence can
lead to that experience more than an external word."72
THE PERSPECTIVE OF METAPHYSICS
Reflection on the conditions of epistemological certainty
and on the extent of our knowledge remain, for Bonaventure, deter-
mining motifs even in his later works. This is true, for example, in a
70. Scientia Chήsύ 7 (CSB 5:40a).
71. Scientia Christi 7 ad 11 (CSB 5:41b).
72. Scientia Christi epilogue (CSB 5:43b).
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scientific-theoretical perspective of De reductione artium ad theologiam,
which also derives from Bonaventure's lecturing activity in 1255—
1257. It holds as well for the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, which
appeared around the end of 1259. The Itinerarium further develops
the central thoughts of his epistemology and metaphysics very much
in the tradition of speculative mysticism.7 3
When these writings appeared, Bonaventure had already left his
teaching position in Paris, having been elected Minister-General of
the Friars Minor on February 2, 1257. He faced the difficult task
of consolidating an order that, given the numbers of its members,
still had only a negligible organization. But Bonaventure stopped in
Paris on several later occasions. The three sermon series in particular,
which he gave in the Franciscan convent there in 1267 (De decem
praeceptίs), 1268 (De donis Spίritus Sancti), and 1273 (Collationes in
Hexaemeron), confirm his unbroken interest in the intellectual life
at Paris, as they show his attempt to tie the Franciscan movement
more strongly to the intellectual developments of its time.7^ This
important feature of his work often falls completely into oblivion. It
is displaced by a spiritual interpretation in the support of a "Franciscan
option" or a "theologie du pauvre."7 5 For our point of view, it is telling
that Bonaventure—like Thomas Aquinas who also returned to Paris,
presumably in 1269, on commission by the general chapter of his
order—intervenes anew in current doctrinal controversies in what
remains the most significant university, controversies again excited
by Aristotelίanism.7 6 The problems, of course, had changed. At the
beginning of his studies, the reception of the libri naturales of Aristotle,
as well as questions about the speculative penetration of the contents
of faith, had stood in the center of the dispute. In the meantime,
73. See Bougerol, Introduction, pp. 7, 215-220; Speer, "Wissenschaft und Erkennt-
nis," pp. 180-184; and Speer, "Metaphysica reducens: Metaphyik als erste Wissenschaft
im Verstandnis Bonaventuras," RTAM 57 (1990): 161-165.
74. Bougerol, Introduction, pp. 227-241.
75. Speer, "Metaphysica reducens" pp. 143-145, in contrast with Werner Dett-
loff, "Die franziskanische Vorentscheidung im theologischen Denken des heiligen
Bonaventura," Munchener Theohgische Zeitschrift 13 (1962): 107-115, and Bougerol,
Introduction, pp. 12-30 and 283-288.
76. Van Steenberghen, La philosophic au Xίίίe siέcle, pp. 427-430, following the
general overview on pp. 411-426.
CERTAINTY AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE 57
the works of Aristotle had at last found a secure place in university
instruction and had been commented upon thoroughly in all their
extent, especially by Albert the Great.
Now the question was how philosophical and theological truth
are related to each other. More precisely, it was how the truth of
the sciences could stand to the truth of a theology that was, by this
time, equally regarded as science. This conflict caught fire particularly
on the questions of the individuality of the intellectual soul and
the eternity of the world. The questions were answered by Parisian
masters like Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who appeal
to Averroes in support of a radical Aristotelianism. They call into
question the synthesis achieved in different ways by Thomas and
Bonaventure.77 With them, metaphysics begins to develop as a science
of first principles founded in reason alone: it enters into competition
with theology, which takes its first principles from revelation. Conse-
quently, metaphysics stood in need of a justification of its knowledge-
of-principles with regard to revelation, and, conversely, the theology
of revelation-principles had to be shown to be possible and necessary
with regard to the philosophic
Against the background of this controversy, Bonaventure by no
means adopts an anti-philosophical attitude, as he is sometimes re-
proached for doing. The conviction of the necessity of an explana-
tion that rests on reason, which stamps the collection of questions
dating from his earlier teaching activities, also determines his last
sermon series on the Hexaemeron. With it, Bonaventure joins an old
tradition of commentary. Reacting against the model of Aristotelian
metaphysics, he formulates his criteria for a metaphysics that can make
good on the claim of metaphysics to be a science that proceeds from
the knowledge of principles and the ultimate foundation. Metaphysics
77. Van Steenberghen speaks both of "Aristotelisme heterodoxe" and of "Aver-
roisme" in La phibsophie au Xίίίe siecle, pp. 357-412. On the doctrinal controversy,
see pp. 413-471.
78. Ludger Honnefelder, "Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik: Ansatze und Folgen
der Wiederbegriindung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert," in Phibsophie im
Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, ed. ] . P. Beckmann et al. (Hamburg,
1987), pp. 165-168; Albert Zimmermann, Ontobgίe oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion
ϋber den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, STGM 8 (Leiden and
Cologne: Brill, 1965), p. 90.
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must bear in mind the emanation, exemplarity, and consummation of
reality, and bear them in mind according to the degree of illumination
and in the manner of a reductio to knowledge of principles.7 9
Nevertheless, Bonaventure keeps in view the limits on the scope
and certainty of rational knowledge. To be sure, metaphysics is for
him the science of being and its principles. Nonetheless, Bonaventure
disputes a broader claim of metaphysics on the way toward a critique
of metaphysics that he also executes as a critique of reason. 8 0 Every
science based on reason is under the verdict of fallibilism. It is also true
of metaphysics, which is distinguished from an ultimate foundation
based on revelation.
Although Bonaventure, once again, underscores the finitude of
human knowledge, he does not mean to deny the object-related use
of reason where this is required. In Bonaventure's eyes, there opens
up a wide field of positive autonomy of scientific rationality, which he
undoubtedly acknowledges and by which he—true child of his t i m e —
feels challenged. Although he clings more tenaciously than many
of his contemporaries to the Augustinian ideal of a comprehensive
Christian wisdom, and, thus, to the fundamental desire for a single
knowledge, he cannot ignore from the outset the confrontation with
the claim of the sciences to explain consistently the connections
of reality.8 1
CONCLUSION
I should like to close with two observations that relate
to the twofold aspect of this essay expressed at the beginning: to treat
one of the great themes of philosophy by looking at a medieval author
whose contribution to the philosophical discussion of the time is, in
general, judged with reserve.
The first observation is intended to hold for the historical evalua-
tion. We were able to see the background against which Bonaventure
79. Coll. in Hexaemeron 1.17 (CSB 5:332b).
80. Compare Coll in Hexaemeron 12.12 (CSB 5:386a).
81. Speer, "Metaphysica reducens" pp. 172-182; Van Steenberghen, La phibsophie
au Xίlίe siede, pp. 197-200.
CERTAINTY AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE 59
develops his epistemological inquiries, the background of contempo*
rary controversies as well as of the tradition preceding Bonaventure.
Both backgrounds must be considered in discerning what determines
Bonaventure's question and his answer. In this sense, the histor*
ical procedure is the necessary condition for philosophical under-
standing; indeed, of any understanding whatever. The same is true
of Bonaventure himself, for the specific appropriation of traditions,
the engagement with their pre-understanding, is the condition for
anything whatever being understood, for there being any questions.
Etienne Gilson speaks of an "Aristotelianizing Augustinianism," and
Fernand van Steenberghen, on the contrary, of an "eclectic and
neo-Platonizing Aristotelianism."82 But any such schematizings of
Bonaventure betray his appropriation of traditions, which proves to
be much more nuanced and topical. His appropriation depends on
the question at hand, for which a given tradition may or may not
offer a model answer.
Among these traditions, the triplet of Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius,
and Aristotle stands out. We can show that Bonaventure is most
conversant with the Aristotelian writings, not only by the multitude
of explicit and implicit references, but also, for example, by his interest
in the new and more exact translations of Aristotle, such as the
nova translatίo of the Nichomachean Ethics by Robert Grosseteste.8-*
Reference has already been made to Bonaventure's thorough engage-
ment with Aristotelian positions, especially in the fourth question.
With Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysian corpus, Bonaventure ap-
peals to the two most influential traditions of Christian reception
and transformation of Platonic and neo-Platonic intellectual riches.
Their diverse character is reflected clearly in the actual systematic
context in which Bonaventure makes use of their arguments. Thus,
we find in connection with the question of the unity and the outer
limit of knowledge—especially in the last three questions, but also in
the third question—multiplied references to the Dionysian concept
of negative theology. Yet Bonaventure develops his epistemological
position and exemplarist ontology on the foundation of Augustine's
82. Gilson, La phibsophie de saint Bonaventure, pp. 390-395; Van Steenberghen,
La phibsophie au Xίίίe siέcle, pp. 15-18 and 246-267.
83. Compare Scienύa Chήsti 4 arg. 16 (5:18b). On the Aristotelian sources, see the
survey by Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et Aristote," AHDLMA 40 (1973): 135-222.
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affirmation of conceivability, modified by the aforementioned influ-
ence of Aristotle.
Or does Bonaventure's epistemological problematic result entirely
from the answers that he finds ready-made in the traditions? It is not
only the working out of particular individual problems in particular
tradition-contexts that suggests such a consideration. The question
extends further. In the example of the problem of certainty, it becomes
clear that Bonaventure's twofold requirement for certainty on the side
of both the object and the subject of knowledge, his connecting of a
priori and a posteriori elements in the analysis of knowledge, arises
out of an intense confrontation with Augustinian and Aristotelian
elements. Here lies Bonaventure's unique contribution.
That brings me to my second observation, which has to do with
the systematic meaning that I have claimed for Bonaventure's answer.
Is there a conceivable aspect under which Bonaventure's reflections
can be answers to today's questions? Such a possibility is, as a rule,
widely excluded especially for medieval authors, often by means of
an appeal to the so-called transcendental turn in philosophy, behind
which no road leads back. But can the reproach that has been made
against "pre-critical" metaphysics, that it mistakenly seeks to explain
the world that exists only in appearance as "real," give itself any
other foundation than to be again merely an appearance? If not, then
it stands under the same proviso, that it is merely one interpretation
of reality that can establish itself in the face of other interpretations
only by being a plausible answer to recent questions. More precisely,
the focus of understanding is that my questions find an answer.8^
This line of argument of recent philosophizing is found, in another
form, within Bonaventure. More strongly than many of his contem-
poraries he reflects on the limits of philosophical knowledge. He sees
the finitude of pure reason. In this sense, all rational knowledge is
provisional. It stands, to put it theologically, under an eschatalogical
reservation.85 For Bonaventure, this is true quite literally. Here I have
come to the decisive point. The fact that our understanding is only an
interpretation of reality is represented by Bonaventure in the manner
84. Compare Josef Simon, Phifosophie des Zeichens (Berlin and New York: W. de
Gruyter, 1989), pp. 13 and 170-174.
85. Compare Collationes de septem donis Spiritus sancti, especially 4 (CSB 5:473-
479) and 8 (5:493-498). On this point, see also Speer, Tήplex veritas, pp. 123-126.
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of a theological critique of philosophy.86 A renewed parallel appears:
the eschatological perfection of the striving after knowledge is not
thought of in the sense of scientific generality, as if it were possible to
win an "objective" standpoint outside history. It is conceived as the
individual coming-to-an-end of questioning and striving. But at that
point all discourse is over. We understand without questioning.87
Universitat zu Kδln
86. Compare Coll. in Hexaemeron 4.1 (CSB 5:349a), 5.2 (5:357b). On the "tenth
Science," which philosophy sought in vain, see Speer, "Metaphysica reducens" p. 179.
87. Compare Sάenύa Christi epilogue (CSB 5:43b); Itinerarium 1.2-6 (5:297a-b),
7.1 (5:312a-b). See also Simon, Phibsophie des Zeichens, pp. 39f and 152f.
